Provoking Japan, Prelude to Pearl Harbor
Deanna Spingola
December 7, 2016
On April 11, 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference, Japanese officials attempted
to insert a “racial equality clause into the League of Nations Covenant but the
Western Powers overruled it, which the Japanese viewed as an affront. On
February 6, 1922, America and Britain created the Nine Power Treaty, apparently
as a method for constraining the Japanese from developing the resources they had
acquired from Russia in Manchuria, renamed Manchukuo. Japan saw this as
commercial rivalry against them. China was Japan’s principle customer, as China
had not developed her own resources and industries. That treaty, which Japan
largely ignored, limited Japan’s activities in Manchuria and Mongolia while it
allowed unlimited Chinese immigration into the area.
On June 6, 1932, President Herbert Hoover appointed
Bostonian Joseph C. Grew, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a
Morgan relative by marriage, as the U.S. Ambassador to Japan. His wife was also
the great niece of Commodore Matthew C. Perry. Grew’s family were longtime
bankers who helped finance the early opium trade into China.
[1] Hoover and J.
P. Morgan Partner, Thomas W. Lamont (
Morgan and Rockefeller, former
competitors, joined forces given their common ambitions, long before the
official outbreak of World War II. The Rockefellers, who financed the IPR and
its activities, simultaneously promoted American warfare against Japan, his
competitors for the oil and rubber resources in Southeast Asia which threatened
the Rockefeller dream of capturing the enormous China market for their
innumerable petroleum products.
[3] Foreign
markets for American oil companies were shrinking as crude oil prices declined.
China adapted cheaper vegetable oils causing Standard’s monopoly in China to
dramatically dwindle. The Soviets now controlled
a quarter of what remained. Besides, the Japanese, had preferential tariff
agreements in their colony, Manchukuo, and undersold everyone. By 1933, the
Soviets were selling gasoline and oil to Siam and Japan, underselling the
Anglo-Dutch and the Americans. By August 1933, Japanese businessmen decided to
do business with only two foreign companies, a Royal Dutch Shell subsidiary and
Socony-Vacuum and the rest of the business would go to four Japanese firms,
including Mitsui Bussan which received gasoline from Socony.
[4]
The
Japanese Ministry of Commerce and Industry sought “national control” and
“petroleum self-sufficiency.” On September 11, 1933, the Ministry introduced
comprehensive policies to strengthen control of refining and distribution, and
encourage greater refining capacity by offering government-subsidies to private
firms for oil exploration efforts. In 1934, Japanese officials enacted
legislation that required licensing for refiners and importers and regulated
them which really vexed western oil officials. To maintain their influence and
profits, Socony and Shell offered to invest in those refineries but the Japanese
rejected their proposals which the companies encumbered with stipulations only
beneficial to them.
[5]
Japanese firms, including Matsukata’s,
were faltering and blamed it on the foreign oil companies. They evaluated other
oil-rich areas to satisfy their needs. Standard’s local manager encouraged U.S.
government intervention to compel Japan to accept a set quantity of gasoline if
they expected a continuation of American crude oil imports. Ambassador Grew
directed the State Department to persuade Shell and Standard to cooperate in
order to retain the Japanese market. However, the American oil overproduction
and enormous quantities of Russian oil threatened continued high profits.
[6]
Japan and China erroneously assumed
that they could extract and control oil within their own countries or
protectorates. Beginning on February 1, 1934, the Chinese government levied an
import tax on kerosene and gasoline to facilitate the future development of a
national oil and gas industry in order to decrease dependence on foreign
resources. American and British oil companies refused to do business under those
conditions. Chinese officials relented but launched the Four Year Plan, a goal
for domestic oil production in the Shensi and Szechuan provinces with a
potential yield of eighty million gallons per year from 500 wells. Nanking
officials arranged to work with the Benedum Tree Company of Pittsburgh, a
private oil exploration company. The U.S. Minister to China, Nelson T. Johnson
and the State Department disqualified the Benedum contract, claiming that the
contract violated the United States policies against monopolies. The State
Department, then and now, only protects selected American businesses while
quashing others.
[7]
On April 2, 1934,
Walter C. Teagle, President of the Standard Oil of New Jersey, met with Interior
Secretary and Oil Administrator, Harold Ickes, to enlist his help in enacting
legislation to regulate crude oil production without affecting refinery
productivity and marketing. Teagle also wanted the government to make the East
Texas Oil field a reserve. To further restrict domestic oil production, he
wanted the government to issue interest-bearing bonds to smaller, independent
companies in exchange for their property. Standard, adept at controlling
American policies, intended to use government power to maneuver the
international market in the same way. Purging independent oil producers would
limit oil exports to Japan and elsewhere and give exclusivity to Standard, Shell
and Texaco.
[8]
Johnson
witnessed similar oil nationalization moves in China, and suggested that
American oil companies hurry and negotiate with the Manchukuo monopoly for the
sale of their crude oil and then liquidate their distribution apparatus in
Manchukuo. Tokyo-based Ambassador Grew, friendly to Standard Oil, admitted
futility in trying to influence the Japanese to abandon their self-sufficiency
efforts and sent a dispatch to Washington suggesting an oil embargo against
Japan. Teagle and Shell’s leadership conferred with Ickes and State Department
officials on August 22 and 23, 1934. Oil companies refused to comply with
Japan’s new regulations, because it would decrease their profits. They demanded
an oil embargo and more representation to the Japanese government. Ickes could,
if persuaded, authorize an embargo order against Japan.
[9]
Erle R. Dickover of the U.S. Embassy in Japan told Kurusu Saburō that the U.S.
government would impose an oil embargo if warranted, especially if Standard lost
the Manchurian kerosene market. Kurusu emphasized that American oil companies
accepted the loss of their vested interests in France and other countries with
similar national oil objectives. The American oil companies
asked Ambassador Grew to intervene in their behalf. Otherwise, as stated in
Business Week, New York and London would force Japan into a showdown. Oil
officials whined to Secretary Ickes, complaining about their financial losses.
Henri Deterding claimed that the British and the Dutch governments would support
American actions. Teagle wanted an oil embargo and a restriction of oil exports
to Japan by all producers. If independents balked, he was certain that the State
Department would sway them. Deterding went to Europe to sell the blockade
proposal to the British and Dutch governments.
[10]
Standard, Shell and Texaco mutually
agreed to cut off all oil to Japan. Standard Oil of California and Union Oil of
California were unwilling and instead gave a price quote to Japan. The
independents received immediate pressure, capitulated and withdrew their bids.
In September 1934, Teagle, back in Washington, complained about the Associated
Oil group in California which owned fifty percent of a Japanese refinery and had
a long-term contract to supply that refinery with crude oil. Teagle wanted Ickes
and the Interior Department’s agencies to devise policies to alter the
Associated Oil group’s arrangement. Standard and Shell officials maintained
correspondence with the Japanese government officials. State Department
officials wanted Standard to work with the British and Dutch oil producers and
consider complying with the Japanese regulations. Teagle would not budge. Surely
the US government could dictate terms to Japan. After all, Japan had no
significant alternatives and inadequate natural resources to be self-sufficient.
American oil firms could cut Japan from other markets and restrict her access to
oil-bearing lands.
[11]
By
mid-autumn 1934, Japan’s oil situation was critical. On November 27, 1934, State
Department representatives met with London’s Foreign Office to consider their
options. Teagle and Deterding were unconcerned about Venezuela, Russia or Mexico
obstructing the embargo. However, Ickes might get pressure from some American
oil companies. They decided to embargo both Japan and Manchukuo.
[12]
In
confidential talks, desperate Japanese gas company representatives agreed to
almost every demand after negotiations ended on April 13, 1935. However, that
did not persuade the officials to rescind the Japanese law. On April 18, 1935, a
Standard-Vacuum official, Kersey F. Coe, asked the State Department to notify
the company’s Tokyo agent to reiterate that in as much as it was contractually
impossible to stop sales of crude from California, Standard-Vacuum intended to
add an extra premium of twenty-five cents on Manchukuo exports. Coe warned of
other obstacles and extra supply costs. In addition, Standard, Shell, or Texaco
refused to ship any more oil to the Manchuria Oil Company.
[13]
On May 18, 1935, Standard Oil billed
the Manchukuo government for damages and loss of business, a total of
$1,781,880.59 including property and equipment. Then in late September, the
Japanese government stated that they had deferred the decision about reserve
supplies until June 30, 1936. The oil companies objected as other countries
might follow suit. The oil companies finally accepted the storage regulations
but asked Mitsui to capitalize the storage facilities. The storage issue
remained a problem throughout the summer of 1936. Meanwhile, the Japanese
government obtained a petroleum concession in
However, East Asian prospects worsened. Ambassador Grew
warned the State Department that the Japanese insisted on self-sufficiency. They
passed additional laws, the Synthetic Petroleum Production Law, the Imperial
Fuel Development Company Law and the Petroleum Resources Exploitation Law. The
American oil companies experienced discrimination in Korea and
Japanese-controlled China with no hopes of recovering their investments.
Influential Anglo-American oil companies preferred profits over peace. They
waged economic warfare against Japan throughout the 1930s. Their egregious
actions against Japan, China, Thailand and other countries throughout Asia
reveal their priorities, all backed by the State Department. Ambassador Grew
wrote, the “application of economic pressure against Japan would inevitably
start our relations on a downward course unless or until we were prepared to
face eventual war.” Grew, understanding the oil interests wrote, “Economic
pressures in the form of embargoes and other similar steps are a form of warfare
and they definitely constitute threats.”
[15]
On August 14, 1936, at Chautauqua, New York, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “We shun political commitments which might entangle
us in foreign wars; we avoid connection with the political activities of the
League of Nations…We are not isolationists except in so far as we seek to
isolate ourselves completely from war…I have seen war…I hate war. I have passed
unnumbered hours, I shall pass unnumbered hours, thinking and planning how war
can be kept from this nation…I wish I could keep war from all nations, but that
is beyond my power. I can at least make certain that no act of the United States
helps to produce or promote war.”
[16]
While Roosevelt was plotting on
getting America involved in warfare in Germany by provoking a Japanese attack
against the United States, those who initiated the economic war against Germany
in 1933 devised a way of not jeopardizing their own lives in warfare, even
before the war erupted in 1939. Obviously, they already knew who the
participants would be.
The Central Committee of the American
Jews at the 47th Annual Conference, Anti-Defamation League, held in
New York on June 26, 1937, sent out a circular declaring an “Exemption of Jews
from military service in accordance with the highest interpretation of Judaism.”
The circular stated, “Why should we, the only truly international people, be
concerned with the mutable interests of stupid Goyim nations? We must do
everything in our power to help the great president who has helped us so greatly
in establishing control. Support the draft law when it is presented to the
American people. Support England and France, for they are fighting Judah’s
greatest enemy, the Goyim German State. You are urged to support United States
participation in this Holy war of Judah, without reservation and without fear.
We can repeat our triumphs of 1918 if we maintain our united front and the dumb
goyim will fight while we profit, with the aid of our friend in Washington.
Powerful Jews will be on all Draft Boards, and Jewish physicians will protect
you from military service. Arrangements are already made to exempt you, in case
religious exemption cannot be prepared in time. You are warned to renounce,
abjure, repudiate and deny any of this information if questioned by Gentiles,
even under oath, as outlined in the Talmud and justified for the preservation of
our race.”
[17]
In 1937, Roosevelt planned to blockade
Japan but American citizens responded negatively to his quarantine speech of
October 5, so he temporarily scrapped his plan. In 1938, his war planners
created a new preliminary plot for a naval war against Japan.
[18] Both Germany
and the Soviet Union invaded Poland in September 1939. Britain and France
ignored the Soviet invasion but quickly declared war on Germany. American
politicians, especially Roosevelt, intended on getting the country embroiled in
warfare against Germany, despite what American citizens wanted. He promised
neutrality if re-elected but insiders knew better. If an opportunity did not
present itself, he would manufacture one.
In August 1940, to prepare for war,
Roosevelt assigned the National Guard to federal service for one year. He sent a
peacetime draft, known as the Burke-Wadsworth Act to Congress, and then Congress
passed the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 on September 14, 1940.
Roosevelt traded fifty old American Navy destroyers to England in exchange for
leases in Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad and British Guiana.
He signed legislation, worth $5 billion, to create a two-ocean navy that would
ultimately incorporate 100 aircraft carriers.
[19]
On September 27, 1940, Japan, Germany and Italy, comprising
the Axis Powers, signed the Tripartite Treaty in Berlin, a military alliance,
which stipulated that if the Allied nations, Britain, the United States and the
Soviet Union attacked any one of the three Axis nations, then all three of those
nations would automatically be at war.
[20] The feasibility of
Germany attacking America was zero, due to Germany’s lack of big planes. Germany
was fortunate to be able to reach Britain with their lightweight planes.
However, if America responded to a Japanese attack, then, according to the
treaty, the United States would enter into the European War.
On
October 7, 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum, the head of the Far
East desk for U.S. Navy intelligence, devised an eight-step plan entitled,
Estimate of the Situation in the Pacific
and Recommendations for Action by the United States to provoke Japan to
attack the United States, supposedly to avert Japan’s hegemony over East Asia.
1) use British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore; 2) use base
facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies; 3) Give all
possible aid to the Chinese Government of Chiang-Kai-Shek; 4) Send a division of
long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore; 5) Send two
divisions of submarines to the Orient; 6) Keep the main strength of the American
Fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands; 7) Insist that
the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions,
particularly oil; and 8) embargo all American trade with Japan, in collaboration
with a similar embargo imposed by Britain. McCollum wrote, “If by these means
Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all
events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.” This document
remained classified until 1994. Roosevelt immediately implemented McCollum’s
plan.
[21]
Accordingly, in October 1940,
Roosevelt requested Navy Secretary Frank Knox to order Admiral James O.
Richardson, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. fleet in the Pacific, to position
American naval ships across the Pacific Ocean in order to prevent Japan from
obtaining crucial supplies. Richardson protested that this blockade was an
obvious act of war. His fleet, inadequately prepared for war, had previously
patrolled the West Coast. He requested that his fleet be withdrawn from Hawaii,
where they were totally exposed and vulnerable. Washington ignored his requests.
In January 1941, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel replaced Richardson and he quickly
raised the same issues with President Roosevelt. On December 16, 1941, after
Pearl Harbor, officials demoted Admiral Kimmel and relieved him of his command.
[22]
For years, the United States had
embargoed Japan, which wholly depended on imports, in order to provoke a
military response. Churchill and Roosevelt, whose governments had already broken
the Japanese communication codes, then monitored the entire progress of Japan’s
military expedition all the way to Pearl Harbor. Japan’s attack, on December 7,
1941, killed unwary military personnel, more “live bait,” which totaled 2,402
people. Thereafter, the media predictably vilified and dehumanized the Japanese.
[1] Sterling Seagrave and Peggy
Seagrave, The Yamato Dynasty, the Secret History of Japan’s Imperial
Family, Broadway Books, New York, 1999, pp. 11, 140
[2] Carroll Quigley, Tragedy And
Hope, A History of the World in our Time, G. S. G. & Associates,
Incorporated, San Pedro, California, 1975, pp. 946-947
[3] John V. Denson, A Century of War:
Lincoln, Wilson & Roosevelt, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn,
Alabama, 2006, p. 166
[4] Thomas A. Breslin, Trouble Over
Oil: America, Japan, and the Oil Cartel 1934-1935, Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Volume 7, Issue: 3, 1975, pp. 41-51
[5] Thomas A. Breslin, Trouble Over
Oil: America, Japan, and the Oil Cartel 1934-1935, Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Volume 7, Issue: 3, 1975, pp. 41-51
[6] Thomas A. Breslin, Trouble Over
Oil: America, Japan, and the Oil Cartel 1934-1935, Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Volume 7, Issue: 3, 1975, pp. 41-51
[7] Thomas A. Breslin, Trouble Over
Oil: America, Japan, and the Oil Cartel 1934-1935, Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Volume 7, Issue: 3, 1975, pp. 41-51
[8] Thomas A. Breslin, Trouble Over
Oil: America, Japan, and the Oil Cartel 1934-1935, Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Volume 7, Issue: 3, 1975, pp. 41-51
[9] Thomas A. Breslin, Trouble Over
Oil: America, Japan, and the Oil Cartel 1934-1935, Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Volume 7, Issue: 3, 1975, pp. 41-51
[10] Thomas A. Breslin, Trouble Over
Oil: America, Japan, and the Oil Cartel 1934-1935, Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Volume 7, Issue: 3, 1975, pp. 41-51
[11] Thomas A. Breslin, Trouble Over
Oil: America, Japan, and the Oil Cartel 1934-1935, Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Volume 7, Issue: 3, 1975, pp. 41-51
[12] Thomas A. Breslin, Trouble Over
Oil: America, Japan, and the Oil Cartel 1934-1935, Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Volume 7, Issue: 3, 1975, pp. 41-51
[13] Thomas A. Breslin, Trouble Over
Oil: America, Japan, and the Oil Cartel 1934-1935, Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Volume 7, Issue: 3, 1975, pp. 41-51
[14] Thomas A. Breslin, Trouble Over
Oil: America, Japan, and the Oil Cartel 1934-1935, Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Volume 7, Issue: 3, 1975, pp. 41-51
[15] Thomas A. Breslin, Trouble Over
Oil: America, Japan, and the Oil Cartel 1934-1935, Bulletin of Concerned
Asian Scholars, Volume 7, Issue: 3, 1975, pp. 41-51
[16] Harry Elmer Barnes, Perpetual
War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath, Caxton Printers, Caldwell,
Idaho, 1953, p. 79
[17] FBI, Cleveland, Ohio, File 62-0,
October 13, 1943, Declassified July 11, 1989, letter from Charles M.
Scott, Informant, a circular letter containing alleged Semitic
propaganda, Scott received a copy of the document in her capacity as a
stenographer for Fisher Cleveland Air Craft Division, General Motors
Corporation, Plant #2, Her supervisor had her make a copy of it and
Scott submitted it to the FBI, the letter of explanation was signed by
Leland V. Boardman, the Special Agent in Charge
[18] Perpetual War for Perpetual
Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and Its Aftermath edited by Harry Elmer Barnes, Caxton
Printers, Caldwell, Idaho, 1953, p. 637
[19] Robert B. Stinnett, Day of
Deceit, the Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor, Touchstone, New York,
2000, pp. 24-25
[20] Tripartite Treaty,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/triparti.asp
[21] John V. Denson, A Century of
War: Lincoln, Wilson & Roosevelt, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn,
Alabama, 2006, pp. 151-152
[22] Robert B. Stinnett, Day of
Deceit, the Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor, Touchstone, New York,
2000, p. 252